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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship among asset liquidation value, liability term structure and
ownership concentration of J-REITs. By employing new proxies of asset liquidation value, we
derived two major implications. First, J-REITs with high ratios of real estate investment assets in
frequently traded areas have longer debt maturity. Second, J-REITs with high concentration ratios
of real estate assets traded in small units such as residential properties also have long term debt
maturity . These relationships are enhanced when the ownership is concentrated. In summary, the
regional characteristics and type of usage of real estate assets are validated as asset liquidation
proxies which influence the liability term structure of J-REITs. However, the existence of a
blockholder is a necessary condition to support this hypothesis.
JEL Classification Code: L85, G30, G32
Keywords: REIT, Liability Structure, Capital Structure
Introduction
Many recent empirical literatures concerning real estate investment trust are focusing on
determinants of capital structure. But, REIT sample data are more persuasive in examining the
theoretical hypothesis because REIT has only one type of assets, i.e., real estate investment asset.
Generally, a firm has a complex line of business and the fixed assets are also owned for a variety of
type of production. REIT is one of a few industries that have a simple asset structural pattern and
this is the reason why recent literatures prefer this appropriate sample for the verification of
corporate balance sheet.
Existing literatures have discussed the determinants of capital structure for the
long-term period. Trade-off and pecking order theories are the two prominent theories in
determining capital structure. The trade-off theory considers capital structure to be determined by
a balance between the benefits and costs of the selected funding schemes. On the other hand, the
pecking order regards information cost imposed on corporate outsiders as influencing the
managerial choice of debt and capital. The capital structure also influences the corporate fixed
asset. Creditors desire avoiding risky investments when the financial leverage is high and this
brings an underinvestment problem to the firm.
Recent literatures pointed out that fixed asset investment and other investment activities
are influenced not only by capital structure, but also by other factors. For instance, it is said that
underinvestment problem is mitigated when the asset liquidity is high even though the financial
3leverage is high. High asset liquidation enables creditors to liquidate the asset when the firm turns
to be insolvent. This means that a firm with less liquid asset must fund by using short-term debt
tools since long-term debt imposes credit risks to banks and others for the long-term period. In this
regard, recent literatures are focusing on how liquidity of asset influences the relationship between
underinvestment problem and capital structure.
Besides, based on the preliminary interview surveys that the author made to REIT
practitioners, a common consistent testimony is that a concentrated ownership structure is one of
the J-REIT uniqueness and this might strongly influence the balance sheet of J-REITs. Hence, this
paper employs J-REIT data as a sample in verifying the hypotheses concerning the relationship
among asset liquidity, liability structure and ownership concentration. This paper obtains
additional contribution to the existing literatures by verifying how ownership structure influences
liability structure coupled with the asset liquidity. The next sectionpresents a series of existing
literatures on the relationship between asset value liquidation and liability structure and explains
how this papercontributes to them. In the third section, we show our hypothesis reflecting existing
literatures and recent practical trend in a J-REIT market. We explain the data in the fourth section
and then, provide explanations of methodology of the empirical study and results in the fifth
section. In the sixth and the final sections, we provide our discussion and conclusion from the
empirical results.
2. Existing Literatures
Real estate securitization is financially used for commercial purpose by issuing securities.
All the firms generally face refinancing risks every time the redemption date of external borrowing
arrives. The purpose of this real estate asset liquidation is mainly to increase the number of
funding schemes thus minimizing the refinancing risks. This asset liquidation scheme enables the
firm to fund depending not on its own creditworthiness, but on real estate value which is
independent from the individual firm’s creditworthiness. Real estate investment trust, as a result,
can collect a number of retail funds from individual investors in a financial market.
Many existing literatures pointed out that a change in asset liquidation value of a firm
influences the capital structure. Originally, Fama and French (2002) organized the related theories
and categorized the determinants of capital structure as trade-off theory and pecking order theory.
As noted in the previous section, trade-off theory suggests that corporate capital structure is
determined by a balance between costs and benefits of the funding schemes. Examples of the cost
are a high probability of underinvestment and liquidation cost. The benefits include minimizing
the free-cash flow problem and mitigating the tax expenditure. However, Myers (1977) and Hart
(1993) have suggested that information cost also influences the corporate capital structure, and a
firm can choose a funding tool depending on the degree of information asymmetry.
Recent literatures focused on both financial leverage and term structure of a firm’s
liability. Barclay et al. (2003) pointed out that a firm is likely to face underinvestment when its
financial leverage is high. This is because creditors do not desire managers to choose aggressive
investment even though its future profitability is expectedly high when the leverage is high. In this
case, risk adverse creditors may prevent professional managers from seeking high profitable
investment project. On the other hand, Williamson (1988) mentioned the term structure of liability
4in addition to the above relationship. Williamson (1988) suggested that a firm with high liquid
assets is allowed to choose various funding tools even though the financial leverage is high. In this
case, the liquidation cost is not expensive even when the debtor turns to be insolvent. Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) supported this idea of Williamson (1988) and further suggested that asset
liquidation value and financial leverage are positively related. A contribution of Shleifer and
Vishny (1992)to the theoretical literature is in finding that an increase in asset liquidation value
mitigates principal-agent problem.
Recent literatures extended the above theoretical approaches to empirical studies.
Benmelech (2005) picked up a funding scheme of the 19th century’s railroad project and
empirically examined the relationship between asset liquidity and financial leverage. Benmelch et.
al. (2005), on the other hand, used commercial mortgage loan data and verified the relationship
between residential mortgage loan maturities and zoning regulation. In addition, more studies are
increasingly using data from REIT market to verify the theoretical frameworks of Williamson
(1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992). By using REIT data, Brown and Riddiough (2003) and
Giambona et. al (2008), examined the relationship among asset liquidation value, debt to equity
ratio and liability structure.
In existing studies on the relationship between asset liquidation value and liability
structure, the discussion focused on how researchers should estimate asset liquidation value as
elaborated in the previously presented three methodologies. First, Geltner and Miller (2001)
regarded lease contract period of REIT properties as liquidation value and examined if this
contract period influenced the liability structure. Geltner and Miller (2001) emphasized that
managers can improve profitability of the property through renovation and other maintenance
efforts when asset liquidity is high. The paper concluded that financial leverage of high asset liquid
REIT could be allowed to be high. The second methodology estimates real estate asset value by
using data from commercial mortgage backed securities (hereafter CMBS) market. As CMBS
market progresses, researchers can obtain asset liquidation price data directly from the market.
Recent statistical development in the CMBS market contributed to further development of the
methodology. The third approach calculates indicators using various quantitative and qualitative
information on real estate assets. The information includes real estate price, zoning regulation and
probability of future liquidation of the real estate. Since this methodology reflects comprehensive
qualitative information that others do not include, the indicators are regarded as useful
information by researchers. Tis methodology was first developed by Society of Industrial Realtors
(1984) and Urban Land Institute (1982). In recent years, Benmelch et. al. (2005) added information
of zoning regulation while Giambona et. al (2008) reflected the possibility for liquidation and term
structure of rental and lease agreement of the assets in addition to information on regulation.
This paper examined the existing literatures on the methodology of asset liquidation
value . The first methodology, i.e., term structure of lease maturity as a proxy of asset liquidation
value, is very objective. However, the lease and rental contract maturity is often determined by
each individual reason of the lessor and tenant. Though objective, the value may not always mean
common universal market liquidity. The second methodology of CMBS market data is frequently
used by the media and credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investors
Service, but not by academia. The reason is that there is a limited number of real estate assets that
are transacted, and low liquidity real estate is not traded in the CMBS market. Our review shows
5that the data could have contained sample biases. Our study also finds the third methodology
containing very comprehensive information on real estate assets. However, we cannot reject the
possibility of the indicator’s arbitrariness.
3. Hypothesis
As seen in the previous sections, there are many existing literatures concerning REIT
and its capital structure. Against these literatures, this paper employs a new methodology to
estimate real estate asset liquidation value and examines the relationship between the value and
the liability structure. In addition, this paper also verifies the above relationship and ownership
structure of J-REIT. The existence of blockholders is J-REIT’s unique characteristicand is made as
part of J-REIT market development.But, market participants practically regard the concentrated
ownership structure as still influencing the credit side of REIT balance sheet.
Based on a series of discussions of Barclay et. al. (2003), Williamson (1988) and Shreifer
and Vishney (1992), it is considered that asset liquidity of REIT also influences the debt to equity
ratio and term structure of the liability. In other words, our hypothesis is that creditors of REIT
who monitor debtor’s repayment capability allow REIT managers to have high debt to equity ratio
when the asset liquidity value is high enough. We hypothesize that liquidity of REIT assets is
determined by regional characteristics and type of usage and these consequently influence the
liability structure. Although Benmelch et. al. (2005) regarded zoning regulation as one of the
elements of real estate asset liquidity, our regional and usage concentration data involved the
qualitative information. Since Tokyo metropolitan area has high real estate transaction frequency
per area, we assume that the concentration in this frequently traded region enables the REIT to
hold high debt to equity ratio and long maturity of liability.
In addition, the concentration and dispersion of real estate investment assets are also
regarded as important factors of liquidation value, even if it is concentrated in the Tokyo
metropolitan area. We hypothesize that J-REITs with low concentration of the top five largest real
estate assets in terms of face values are highly liquid and find it easier to make cash than REITs
with high concentration of the top five real estate assets. Third, we also hypothesize that real estate
asset liquidation values are not only related with liability structure, but also with ownership
structure of REITs, particularly in the case of J-REIT. In existing literatures, Pound (1988), Brickley
et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) mentioned that the
existence of blockholders improves managerial discipline of the firm through mitigation of
divergence of interests among the shareholders. The above literatures did not discuss the
relationship among asset liquidation value, liability structure and ownership concentration, but we
considered such relationship in our study. Our hypothesis is that REITs with high asset liquidation
are allowed to have long maturing debts when the ownership is concentrated. We believe
investors in J-REIT market feel this is plausible. In the process of J-REIT market development,
major real estate firms and financial firms established REITs and remained as the largest
shareholders. In fact external investors regard the shareholders and the REITs to be on the same
side, i.e., the debt of J-REITs are implicitly guaranteed by the founder who are the largest
blockholders.
64. Data
This paper uses REIT’s financial statement and ownership data from Thomson Reuters
and the real estate investment asset values of each REIT by region and type of usage are taken
from the Japanese Annual Securities Financial Report. Total value of the top five investment assets
are also obtained from the report. The sample period of the data covers 2003 to 2008. As for real
estate asset data, the Japanese Ministry of Finance which supervises Japanese Annual Securities
Financial Report requests all the REITs to disclose complete information on each individual
property that the REIT has. However, since the definition of regional classification are sometimes
different by REIT, we re-categorized and re-aggregated the data as follows: (1) Tokyo with 23
wards,( 2) Tokyo metropolitan area excluding 23 wards plus neighboring prefectures, and (3)
other local cities. The usage of real estate assets in the report is commonly defined among the 41
REITs. Therefore, we use these data directly in calculating the concentration ratio of (1) residential,
(2) office building, (3) commercial facility, and (4) hotels and others. We also obtained REIT
ownership data from Thomson Reuters and calculated the top five ratios and foreign ownership
ratios from the data as proxies of ownership concentration.
5. Empirical Analyses
5.1 Asset Concentration and Liability Structure
The first empirical study examines the relationship among the concentration of real
estate investment to the small number of assets, debt to equity ratio and liability structure of
J-REITs. Here, we proxied the concentration as an inverse value of asset liquidation. The latest raw
J-REIT data suggested that some J-REITs have a small limited number of real estate properties, i.e,
a few big properties, and others have many small value of properties. The former group has high
ratio of top five asset concentration and the latter has low ratio, naturally. Our hypothesis is that
J-REITs with a large number of small valued properties are allowed to have high debt to equity
ratio or long maturity of liability compared to REITs with one big property. This hypothesis
assumes that debtors can request managers for either asset liquidation or reallocation of the
existing portfolio as each real estate assets are in small lots when the asset concentration is low.
Prominent literatures of Barclay et. al.(2003) and Williamson (1988) said that a firm with high debt
to equity ratio is likely to face underinvestment problem. This theoretical background assumes
that creditors request managers to take risk adverse investment. To examine the above hypothesis,
we employed the following equation models.
  OwnershipionConcentratDERconstShortDebt 321
(5. 1)
114131211   FirmSizeMBRROAShortDebtconstDER
(5. 2)
ShortDebt: Short-term Borrowing Outstanding divided by Total Liability, DER: Total Liability divided by
Market Value of Capital, Concentration: Top Five Investment Asset Concentration divided by Total Investment
Assets, Ownership: Top five ownership ratio, ROA: Return on Total Assets, MBR: Total Liability plus Market
7Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets, FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets
This analysis employed simultaneous equation system of two stage least squares that
includes top five asset concentration as an instrument variable. In this model, short-term debt
divided by total liability and debt to equity ratio are endogenous variables. Judging from the
Hausman specification Test, we employed the results of fixed effect model. Following results are
derived from the estimation. First, our empirical results indicate that REITs with high debt to
equity ratio statistically depend on short-term borrowing. Second, parameter of top five
concentration is significantly positive in model (a). In other words, REITs with large number of
relatively small properties can find financing through long-term borrowing. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that dispersion of real estate assets contributes to an increase in long-term liability
maturity.
Table. 1 Empirical Result 1: Real Estate Asset Concentration and Liability Structure
Note 1: ***. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively
Note 2: Dum04-Dum07 are year dummy variables.
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs.
5. 2 Regional Concentration as Asset Liquidation Value
The second hypothesis of our study is on the relationship between regional
concentration of real estate investment assets and liability structure. According to the fiscal year
2007 version of White Paper on Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (footnote this source), the
total number of real estate transactions was 1.6 million deals in 2005, but Tokyo accounts for more
than thirty percent of this total. In addition, Japan’s average size of area traded was 69 thousand
hectares, with one-fifteenth of the all-Japan average in Tokyo. In other words, the number of deals
per one hectare was 42.7 deals in Tokyo which is four times as large as that of Japan’s total average.
(a) Dep. Var.= ShortDebt (b) Dep. Var.= DER
Endogenous Variables
ShortDebt 1.320 (0.640)
DER 0.046 ** (2.020)
Instruments Variables
ROA -0.819 *** (-6.650)
FirmSize 0.875 *** (3.970)
MBR 1.844 *** (3.670)
Concentration 0.001 ** (2.200)
Ownership -0.004 *** (-2.770)
Dum04 0.135 (0.560) -1.727 (-0.340)
Dum05 0.122 (0.640) -1.908 (-0.460)
Dum06 0.111 (0.550) -0.826 (-0.280)
Dum07 0.119 (0.580) -0.932 (-0.450)
Const -4.668 (-0.520) 13.835 (0.340)
F Statistic 2.420 *** 2.440 ***
Hausman Specification Test 20.420 * 22.520 **
Observations 111 111
Firms 38 38
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
8Intuitively, these basic statistics suggest that real estate asset liquidation values of these areas are
high. This section examines the relationship between regional concentration of real estate
investment assets and liability term-structure. Here, we regard regional investment concentration
as a proxy of asset liquidation value. In other words, asset concentration to metropolitan area
equals high asset liquidity. To verify the relationship between this variable and liability structure,
an empirical equation model is employed as follows:
vOwnershipAREAOwnershipAREA
OwnershipAREADERconstLongDebt

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(5. 3)
224232221   FirmSizeMBRROALongDebtconstDER (5. 4)
LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability, DER: Total Liability divided by Market Value of Capital,
AREA- 1) Tokyo23: Real Estate Assets Invested in Tokyo 23 wards divided by Total Investment Assets, AREA-
2) MetroArea: Real Estate Assets Invested in Tokyo excl. 23 wards plus neighboring prefectures divided by
Total Investment Assets, AREA- 3) LocalCity: Real Estate Assets Invested in Local Cities other than Tokyo23
and MetroArea divided by Total Investment Assets, Ownership: Top five ownership ratio, ROA: Return on
Total Assets, MBR: Total Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets,
FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets.
We also employed simultaneous equation system of two least squares for this model.
Hausman specification statistics suggest that models (a) and (b) should not be estimated by fixed
effect model, but it is allowed in model (c). In case of simultaneous equation system of two least
squares, we cannot technically implement Breush Pagan test. Therefore, Table 2.reports the result
of the error component two-stage least squares of random effect model. The results of another
possible methodology, i.e., OLS pooling estimation results are shown in Appendix 1. We
employed both long-term borrowing and short-term borrowing divided by total liability as
dependent variables, but we report the former since the overall performance of the empirical
results is better. Empirical results are as follows.
Empirical results of random effect models of (a) – (b) suggest that the parameters of
Tokyo23 and MetroArea are significant. And in case of Model (b), the intersected variables
between regional concentration and ownership are significantly positive. This means that REITs
with high investment ratio in Tokyo 23 wards or Tokyo excluding 23 wards plus neighboring
prefectures promoted long-term liability maturity. The existence of a blockholder is necessary in
case of Tokyo excluding 23 wards plus neighboring prefectures. On the other hand, the parameter
of Local city and the intersected variable with ownership are insignificant and this means that
investment concentration in local cities is not related with liability structure.
Table 2. Empirical Result 2: Regional Asset Concentration and Liability Structure
9Note 1: ***. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively
Note 2: Dum04-Dum07 are year dummy variables.
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs.
5.3 Usage of Real Estate Assets as Asset Liquidation Value
This empirical analysis focuses on the relationship between usage of real estate assets
invested by REIT and the liability term structure. As noted by Giambona et al. (2008), it is regarded
that asset liquidation value of real estate property is different by usage and purposes. Giambona et
al. (2008) categorized real estate assets into four types, i.e., industrial usage, apartment, hotel, and
office in descending order of asset liquidation value. The Japanese Annual Securities Financial
Reportdiffers from the definition of Giambona et al. (2008), following four definition is common,
(a) Dep. Var.= LongDebt (b) Dep. Var.= LongDebt (c) Dep. Var.= LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
DER -0.015 *** (-4.320) -0.016 *** (-4.280) -0.015 *** (-4.350)
Instruments Variables
Tokyo23 0.178 ** (2.330)
MetroArea 0.012 ** (2.070)
LocalCity -0.410 (-0.880)
Ownership 0.112 * (1.800) 0.110 * (1.810) 0.111 * (1.810)
Ownership*Tokyo23 0.222 (0.710)
Ownership*MetroArea 0.307 *** (2.660)
Ownership*LocalCity 1.744 (0.370)
{Tokyo23}^2 0.112 (0.470)
{MeroArea}^2 0.044 (0.810)
{LocalCity}^2 0.100 (0.740)
{Ownership}^2 -0.322 (-0.770) -0.321 (-0.870) -0.344 (-0.910)
Dum04 0.085 (0.980) 0.069 (0.920) 0.067 (0.970)
Dum05 0.026 (0.860) 0.018 (0.740) 0.017 (0.720)
Dum06 0.033 (0.780) 0.046 (0.760) 0.034 (0.920)
Dum07 0.041 (0.970) 0.042 (0.960) -0.047 (0.910)
Const -1.026 (-1.420) -0.916 (-1.060) -0.897 (-1.040)
F Statistic 7.510 ***
Hausman Specification Test 15.260 16.020 35.960 ***
Observations 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38
(a)' Dep. Var.= DER (b)' Dep. Var.= DER (c)' Dep. Var.= DER
Endogenous Variable
LongDebt -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410)
Instruments Variables
ROA -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450)
FirmSize 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440)
MBR 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970)
Dum04 -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050)
Dum05 -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370)
Dum06 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610)
Dum07 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790)
Const 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490)
F Statistic 5.420 *** 5.110 *** 5.420 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.210 *** 39.210 *** 39.210 ***
Observations 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38
Random Effect Model Random Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
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i.e., residential real estate, office, commercial usage and hotel. This paper accordingly employed
the common definition of Japanese Annual Securities Financial Report and examined the
relationship between investment ratios of the above four types of usage and liability maturity
considering the influence from ownership structure.


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(5. 5)
334333231   FirmSizeMBRROALongDebtconstDER (5. 6)
LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability, DER: Total Liability divided by Market Value of Capital,
Type-Residence: Real Estate Assets Invested in Retail Residence divided by Total Investment Assets, Office: Real
Estate Assets Invested in Office Building divided by Total Investment Assets, Hotel: Real Estate Assets Invested
in Hotel divided by Total Investment Assets, Commerce: Real Estate Assets Invested in Commercial Facilities
divided by Total Investment Assets, Ownership: Top five ownership ratio, ROA: Return on Total Assets, MBR:
Total Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets, FirmSize: Natural
Logarithm of Total Assets.
The following empirical results are obtained from the estimation. In this analysis, we
also estimated a model by fixed effect and find out if the methodology is appropriate by looking at
Hausman specification test. The statistics suggest that we should employ results of fixed effect
estimation in models (a)-(d). The results of fixed effect models show that the parameter of retail
residential usage ratio was significant and also the parameter was significantly positive when the
variable intersected with ownership concentration. This means that REITs investing in residential
properties are allowed to finance through long-term debts. On the other hand, parameters of office
and commercial usage are insignificant. Parameters of these variables are also insignificant when
those are intersected by ownership concentration. A parameter of hotel is also insignificant.
Table 3. Empirical Result 3: Asset Concentration by Usage and Liability Structure
11
Note 1: ***. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively
Note 2: Dum04-Dum07 are year dummy variables.
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs.
5.4 Asset Liquidation Value and the Ownership Structure
The empirical studies of sections 5.2 and 5.3 focused on the relationship between new
proxies of asset liquidation value and liability maturity. In this section, we elaborate the influence
from ownership structure to enhance a comprehensive understanding of J-REIT capital structure.
In existing literatures, Pound (1988) and Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) pointed out that the existence
of a blockholder mitigates divergence of interests of shareholders and strengthens disciplines of
managers. We hypothesize that ownership concentration by real estate business firms coupled
with asset liquidation proxies influences liability structure. In other words, we assume that
(a) Dep. Var.= LongDebt (b) Dep. Var.= LongDebt (c) Dep. Var.= LongDebt (d) Dep. Var.= LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
DER -0.011 *** (-4.410) -0.010 *** (-4.980) -0.014 *** (-4.810) -0.012 *** (-5.010)
Instruments Variables
Residence 0.001 * (1.790)
Office -0.248 (-0.360)
Hotel 4.758 (0.720)
Commerce -0.001 (-0.030)
Ownership 0.101 * (1.880) 0.126 * (1.710) 0.111 * (1.900) 0.140 * (1.810)
Ownership*Residence 0.270 *** (2.640)
Ownership*Office -0.311 (-0.910)
Ownership*Hotel 0.010 (1.100)
Ownership*Commerce -0.519 (-1.100)
{Residence}^2 -0.223 (-0.360)
{Office}^2 0.154 (0.220)
{Hotel}^2 -0.040 (-0.140)
{Commerce}^2 -0.570 (-0.580)
{Ownership}^2 -0.444 (-0.270) -0.764 (-0.330) -0.649 (-0.410) -0.991 (-0.640)
Dum04 0.061 (0.630) 0.065 (0.740) 0.086 (0.990) 0.063 (0.650)
Dum05 0.009 (0.140) 0.013 (0.210) 0.020 (0.350) 0.009 (0.150)
Dum06 0.047 (0.840) 0.056 (0.940) 0.064 (0.550) 0.077 (0.640)
Dum07 0.015 (0.960) 0.042 (0.950) 0.030 (0.700) 0.042 (0.960)
Const -0.919 ** (-1.960) -0.921 (-1.070) -1.028 (-1.210) -0.922 (-1.060)
F Statistic 6.700 *** 6.220 *** 7.200 *** 7.440 ***
Hausman Specification Test 30.280 *** 39.160 *** 39.390 *** 38.960 ***
Observations 119 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38 38
(a) Dep. Var.= DER (b) Dep. Var.= DER (c) Dep. Var.= DER (d) Dep. Var.= DER
Endogenous Variable
LongDebt -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410)
Instruments Variables
ROA -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450)
FirmSize 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440)
MBR 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970)
Dum04 -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050)
Dum05 -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370)
Dum06 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610)
Dum07 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790)
Const 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490)
F Statistic 5.420 *** 5.420 *** 5.420 *** 5.420 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.210 *** 39.210 *** 39.210 *** 39.210 ***
Observations 119 119 119 119
Firms 38 38 38 38
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
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concentrated J-REIT owners of financial institutions and foreign investors do not relate to the
liability structure. The first reason for this hypothesis is that converged interests of the small
number of J-REIT shareholders enable them to request REIT managers to revise their property
asset allocations. The second reason is that the owners have expertise of real estate asset allocations
when the big owners are real estate business firms. The third reason is that the existence of a big
real estate business owner reflects that the creditworthiness of REIT is guaranteed since many
market participants know the big owners were often involved as founders of the REIT.




3_2_1_
)(
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OwnershipOwnershipOwnership
orTypeAREADERconstLongDebt
(5. 7)
444434241   FirmSizeMBRROALongDebtconstDER (5. 8)
LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability, DER: Total Liability divided by Market Value of Capital,
AREA- MetroArea: Real Estate Assets Invested in Tokyo excl. 23 wards plus neighboring prefectures divided
by Total Investment Assets,Type-Residence: Real Estate Assets Invested in Retail Residence divided by Total
Investment Assets, Ownership 1: Ownership ratio of a Top Real Estate Firm, Ownership 2: Ownership ratio of a
Top Financial Institution, Ownership 3: Ownership ratio of a Top Foreigner, ROA: Return on Total Assets, MBR:
Total Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets, FirmSize: Natural
Logarithm of Total Assets.
Empirical analysis of this section employed two variables, i.e., investment ratio of Tokyo
excluding 23 wards plus neighboring prefectures and that of residential real estate property as
proxies of asset liquidation value. Three ownership data are obtained from Thomson Reuters. The
first is the largest ownership ratio of real estate business firms to the total stock issued. The second
is the largest ownership ratio of financial institutions to the total stock issued. The third is foreign
ownership concentration, i.e., foreign ownership concentration to the total stock issued. Judging
from Hausman specification tests, we employed fixed effect model for both (a) and (b). Following
results are obtained from the empirical study.
First, the relationship between ownership concentration to real estate business firms and
long-term debt to the total liability are positively significant. On the other hand, parameters of
ownership concentration of financial institutions and foreigners are both insignificant.
Table 4. Empirical Result 4: Ownership Concentration and Liability Structure
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Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively
Note 2: Dum04-Dum07 are year dummy variables.
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs.
6. Liability Structure and Ownership Concentration: An International Comparison
This study tries to determine if the empirical results the relationship between ownership
structure and the liability term structure are also true for other REIT markets of the world. This
section employs individual REIT financial data from the United States, Canada, Australia and
Singapore that are the four world largest REIT markets. While the number of the listed REITs in
(a) Dep. Var.= LongDebt (b) Dep. Var.= LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
DER -0.011 *** (-4.520) -0.011 *** (-5.000)
Instruments Variables
MetroArea 0.169 ** (2.220)
Residence 0.004 ** (2.100)
Ownership by Real Estate 0.992 *** (4.200) 0.989 *** (3.020)
Ownership by Financial Institutions -0.141 (-0.840) -0.090 (-1.100)
Ownership by Foreigners 0.400 (0.810) 0.745 (0.410)
Dum04 -0.170 (-1.280) -0.185 (-1.430)
Dum05 -0.291 (-0.710) -0.293 (-0.720)
Dum06 -0.371 (-0.760) -0.375 (-0.780)
Dum07 -0.125 (-0.780) -0.128 (-0.820)
Const 0.634 (0.780) 0.649 (0.790)
F Statistic 8.820 *** 8.550 ***
Hausman Specification Test 31.860 *** 32.040 ***
Observations 99 99
Firms 32 32
(a) Dep. Var.= DER (b) Dep. Var.= DER
Endogenous Variable
LongDebt -1.722 (-1.000) -1.722 (-1.000)
Instruments Variables
ROA -0.661 *** (-3.450) -0.661 *** (-3.450)
FirmSize 0.574 *** (2.940) 0.574 *** (2.940)
MBR 1.226 *** (2.990) 1.226 *** (2.990)
Dum04 -0.239 (-1.240) -0.239 (-1.240)
Dum05 -0.322 (-1.450) -0.322 (-1.450)
Dum06 -0.390 (-0.980) -0.390 (-0.980)
Dum07 -0.135 (-0.820) -0.135 (-0.820)
Const 0.256 (0.320) 0.256 (0.320)
F Statistic 9.100 *** 9.100 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.780 *** 39.780 ***
Observations 99 99
Firms 32 32
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
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Japan totaled4 41 investment trusts as of the end of December 2008, those were 151 in the United
States, 31 in Canada, 69 in Australia and 20 investment trusts in Singapore, respectively. Of course,
the larger the number of the sample countries the better it is to compare the results internationally.
Although the REIT markets in the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Hong Kong are relatively large,
the numbers of listed trust funds are less than 20. These four markets were then compared with
the above four markets to Japan.
Similar to the empirical analyses in other sections, we obtained both financial data and
ownership data from Thomson Reuters. The estimated simultaneous equations are as follows:




2
6
2
5
4321
OwnershipMBR
OwnershipMBROwnershipMBRDERconstShortDebt
(5. 9)
554535251   FirmSizeMBRROAShortDebtconstDER (5. 10)
ShortDebt: Short-term Debt divided by Total Liability, DER: Total Liability divided by Market Value of Capital,
Ownership: Top Five Shareholder Ownership Concentrations, ROA: Return on Total Assets, MBR: Total
Liability plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets, FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of
Total Assets.
In the case of Japan, Canada and Australia, the empirical results of the fixed effect
models are employed since the Hausman Specification Tests are significant. Results of random
effect estimation are shown in the case of the United States and Singapore, while OLS pooling
results of these two countries are indicated in Appendix 2. The empirical results suggest that
parameters of the top five ownership concentrations are significantly negative in Japan, the United
States, Canada and Singapore. Only Australia is the exception. Earlier, the background of this
paper assumed that ownership concentration in REIT market is a unique character of J-REITs, but
these results suggest that the concentration statistically influences to the liability term-structure in
the major world REIT markets.
Table 5. Empirical Result 5: Liability Term Structure and Ownership Concentration
15
Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively
Note 2: Dum01-Dum07 are year dummy variables.
Note 3: Sample includes bankrupt REITs.
7. Discussion
This section discusses the implications obtained from the empirical results of the study.
First, the proxies used based on regional characteristics and the type of usage as asset liquidation
values are appropriate. Historically, as shown by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism, Tokyo, including 23 wards and other districts, has the highest frequency of real estate
transaction per unit area.. There is no doubt that real estate assets in this area has relatively been
easy to convert to cash when needed. Another important information from our empirical results is
that the real estate assets traded by a small unit can also be converted to cash rather easily. Here,
real estate assets of J-REIT in Tokyo’s 23 wards are mostly office buildings and commercial
facilities that are traded by a big unit. The liquidation of these assets is harder than those of
residential properties traded by a small unit. Small size REITs cannot hold a complex of office
buildings, but can hold a number of residential apartments. Our empirical analysis confirms the
(a) Japan (b) United States (c) Canada (d) Australia (e) Singapore
Endogenous Variable
DER 0.044 ** (2.020) 0.120 *** (4.950) 0.332 *** (3.680) 0.441 *** (2.940) 0.110 *** (4.550)
Instruments Variables
MBR 1.022 (0.440) -0.116 (-0.310) 0.043 (0.440) 0.026 (0.170) -0.556 * (-2.000)
Ownership -0.006 ** (-2.360) -9.977 *** (-3.390) -0.418 * (-1.770) 0.432 (0.320) -1.719 * (1.990)
Ownership*MBR 0.908 (0.710) 0.034 (0.670) -0.064 * (-1.930) -1.166 (-0.950) -0.417 (-0.460)
Ownership^2 -0.152 (-0.490) 4.499 (1.450) -0.406 (-1.560) 1.365 * (1.900) -1.153 (-1.080)
MBR^2 0.024 (0.260) 0.010 * (1.850) 0.037 (1.470) -1.036 * (-1.680) 0.020 (0.140)
Dum01 1.158 * (1.880) -0.216 ** (-2.400) 0.862 *** (3.810) -0.144 (-0.100)
Dum02 -1.017 * (-1.740) 0.103 (1.610) 0.309 (1.400) -0.230 (-0.840)
Dum03 -0.931 (-1.630) 0.021 (0.340) 0.041 (0.200) -0.470 (-0.930)
Dum04 0.119 (0.440) -0.842 (-1.560) -0.012 (-0.220) 0.095 (0.049) -0.147 (-0.660)
Dum05 0.141 (0.540) -0.643 (-1.280) -0.033 (-0.650) 0.123 (0.680) -0.075 (-0.370)
Dum06 0.159 (0.520) -0.399 (-0.850) -0.061 (-1.260) 0.154 (1.020) -0.105 (-0.540)
Dum07 0.146 (0.510) -0.223 (-0.500) -0.068 (-1.630) 0.069 (0.570) -0.030 (-0.200)
Const -4.298 (-0.700) 4.771 * (2.020) 0.224 (1.340) -2.874 ** (-2.540) 2.372 * (1.860)
F Statistic 2.320 *** 1.740 * 1.460 *
Hausman Specification Test 30.750 *** 56.650 *** 57.730 ***
Observations 120 923 89 134 42
Firms 41 149 18 34 16
(a) Japan (b) United States (c) Canada (d) Australia (e) Singapore
Endogenous Variable
ShortDebt 0.920 (1.020) -0.011 (-0.520) -0.040 (-0.120) 0.711 (0.890) 1.810 (0.710)
Instruments Variables
ROA -0.818 *** (-4.650) -0.295 ** (-2.280) -0.252 ** (-2.080) 1.726 ** (2.470) 0.125 (0.690)
FirmSize 0.628 *** (2.780) -0.085 (-0.320) 0.638 (0.470) 1.454 (1.550) 1.081 (1.040)
MBR 1.636 *** (2.860) -0.171 (-0.550) 0.004 (0.210) 0.023 (0.270) -0.378 * (-2.130)
Dum01 1.873 *** (3.670) -0.086 (-1.030) 0.436 *** (2.770) -0.110 (-0.550)
Dum02 -0.413 (-0.830) 0.122 * (1.910) -0.024 (-0.150) -0.021 (-0.460)
Dum03 -0.398 (-0.810) 0.059 (1.080) -0.216 (-1.330) -0.300 (-0.140)
Dum04 -1.735 (-0.440) -0.372 (-0.720) 0.021 (0.440) -0.139 (-0.890) -0.082 (-0.370)
Dum05 -1.834 (-0.340) -0.283 (-0.620) -0.010 (-0.200) -0.068 (-0.460) -0.054 (-0.280)
Dum06 -0.867 (-0.180) -0.170 (-0.380) -0.045 (-1.000) 0.005 (0.040) 0.026 (0.160)
Dum07 -0.968 (-0.510) -0.088 (-0.200) -0.042 (-1.000) -0.044 (-0.380) 0.081 (0.660)
Const 13.537 (0.410) 2.518 *** (3.330) 0.121 (1.340) -0.377 (-0.580) 0.815 (1.510)
F Statistic 1.920 *** 1.740 * 1.460 *
Hausman Specification Test 30.450 *** 56.650 *** 57.730 ***
Observations 120 923 89 134 42
Firms 41 149 18 34 16
Random Effect Model
Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect ModelRandom Effect Model
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significance of the positive relationship among investment ratio of Tokyo (excluding 23 wards plus
neighboring prefectures),residential property assets, and liability maturity.
At the beginning of this study, we felt the Japanese Annual Securities Financial Report
did not disclose enough information about trust contract period of real estate properties. Therefore,
we could not employ the same proxies as those in other literatures. However, we also felt that the
proxies of trust contract period used by other literatures is not always an appropriate variable of
the asset liquidation value. For instance, the existence of individual factors between lessor and
lessee and traditional business practice also influence the period of trust contract. Consequently,
regional investment ratio and the usage as proxies of asset liquidation values contain various
qualitative information. Those ratios do not only include information on frequency of transaction,
but also the result of zoning regulation, individual contract factors and traditional business practice
and other possible factors that might influence the asset liquidation value. Finding out the
relationship between this variable and liability structure under the high ownership concentration
is one of the contributions of this paper.
Another contribution of this paper is in finding that the existence of large shareholders is
an important factor in influencing the relationship between the debit and credit side of the J-REIT
balance sheet. Our empirical results suggest that J-REIT managers could possibly find funds
through long maturity debt when ownership is concentrated. As the historical process of J-REIT
development might influence this, ownership concentration in real estate industry is important.
Our empirical results also suggest that foreign investors that account for more than 70
percent of J-REIT market turnover in Tokyo Stock Exchange do not have to do with debt maturity
of J-REITs. We found that foreign investors preferred and purchased J-REITs that have high asset
liquidation values in the secondary market, but they do not influence the managerial issues of the
J-REITs. This must be a consequence of the behavior of the foreign institutional investors. Foreign
investors most likely feel that J-REITs with high liquidation values are implicitly guaranteed by
mother companies of the real estate industry and the creditworthiness is often more than those of
mother firms. For instance, foreign institutional investors compare the price of Hankyu REIT, Inc.
and the stock price of owner, i.e., Hankyu Realty Co. Ltd. We obtained information on arbitrage
activities of foreign investors from our interview survey at Chuo-Mitsui Trust Corp, Ltd. on April
3, 2009. The results of the survey revealed that the foreign owners do not intervene in the
management of the REITs since the foreigners always focus on the secondary market. In summary,
while the primary market of J-REITs is historically involved in real estate industries and the
blockholders influence the internal management, foreigners transact in the secondary market and
do not intervene as owners.
Furthermore, our empirical results provide other implications as follows. First, the
continuing excessive concentration in Tokyo real estate market also increases the asset liquidity of
J-REIT balance sheets. This has also encouraged the potential participants to take part in this
concentrated market since the market has a high liquidity. On the other hand, according to our
study, the central part of Tokyo area does not always have the highest liquidity, because only a
limited number of large asset sized J-REIT can participate in the concentrated office building
market. In fact, asset liquidity of Tokyo (excluding23 wards and neighboring prefectures is rather
high and investment concentration in these areas also influences the liability structure of J-REIT. In
the case of J-REIT market, the existence of big owners is important in finding the linear relationship
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between asset liquidation value and liability structure. In summary, under the excessive market
concentration in the Tokyo metropolitan area, zoning regulation allows the establishment of
residential property preferred by investors. Hence, the number of market participants of J-REITs is
large as a result.
Concluding Remarks
The balance sheet of REIT provides various useful information and this paper obtained
several implications from the results of our empirical analyses. The main contribution of this paper
is in finding a significant relationship between new proxies of asset liquidation values and liability
term-structure. The newly employed proxies are variables of regional characteristics and the usage
of real estate property. Although existing literatures picked out various proxies of the liquidation
value, we applied the ideas for alternative variables. Another implication of this paper is that
under the recent excessive concentration of real estate market in the metropolitan area, the
combination of regional characteristics and the type of usage is the most important in influencing
the liability structure of J-REITs. However, the regional characteristics and the type of usage have
nothing to do with the liability structure by themselves, but the ownership structure can smoothen
their funding activities. Although few literatures covered the liability term-structure, as well as
ownership structure, we stepped into this area in our study. We sampled J-REITs because REIT
holds only one type of assets in the balance sheet, i.e., real estate investment assets. Although
manufactures hold various types of assets as a result of fixed asset investment, we assume the
asset liquidation of these fixed tangible assets could also influence the liability structure. In recent
years, the commodity markets of semiconductor, liquid crystal panel and flash memory device
developed secondary markets. The secondary market of basic materials also experienced a
dramatic progress. We expect future studies to attempt treating the above assets as liquidation
values and verify the relationship with liability and ownership structure.
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Appendix 1: OLS Pooling Results of Regional Concentration as Liquidation Value
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Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively
Note 2: Dum01-Dum07 are year dummy variables.
Appendix 2: OLS Pooling Results of Short-term Debt and Ownership Concentration
(a) Dep. Var.= LongDebt (b) Dep. Var.= LongDebt
Endogenous Variable
DER -0.010 *** (-7.010) -0.009 *** (-6.420)
Instruments Variables
Tokyo23 0.161 * (1.910)
MetroArea 0.015 ** (2.100)
LocalCity
Ownership 0.095 ** (2.220) 0.080 * (1.830)
Ownership*Tokyo23 0.140 (0.410)
Ownership*MetroArea 0.311 *** (2.740)
Ownership*LocalCity
{Tokyo23}^2 0.144 (0.350)
{MeroArea}^2 0.034 (0.710)
{LocalCity}^2
{Ownership}^2 -0.224 (-0.780) -0.241 (-0.990)
Dum04 0.076 (0.910) 0.044 (0.910)
Dum05 0.019 (0.790) 0.007 (0.640)
Dum06 0.028 (0.660) 0.057 (0.510)
Dum07 0.037 (0.780) 0.085 (0.480)
Const -0.097 (-1.310) -0.840 (-1.040)
F Statistic 4.090 *** 3.880 **
R2 0.039 0.044
Observations 119 119
(a)' Dep. Var.= DER (b)' Dep. Var.= DER
Endogenous Variable
LongDebt -2.111 (-0.410) -2.111 (-0.410)
Instruments Variables
ROA -0.774 *** (-5.450) -0.774 *** (-5.450)
FirmSize 0.747 *** (3.440) 0.747 *** (3.440)
MBR 1.119 *** (3.970) 1.119 *** (3.970)
Dum04 -0.004 (-0.050) -0.004 (-0.050)
Dum05 -0.019 (-0.370) -0.019 (-0.370)
Dum06 0.041 (0.610) 0.041 (0.610)
Dum07 0.029 (0.790) 0.029 (0.790)
Const 0.176 (0.490) 0.176 (0.490)
F Statistic 5.420 *** 5.420 ***
Hausman Specification Test 39.210 *** 39.210 ***
Observations 119 119
Firms 38 38
Fixed Effect Model Fixed Effect Model
OLS Pooling Model OLS Pooling Model
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of Empirical Data
(A) J-REIT
(b) United States (e) Singapore
Endogenous Variable
DER 0.097 *** (3.220) 0.419 *** (5.150)
MBR -0.094 (-0.710) -0.552 (-1.140)
Instruments Variables
Ownership -6.967 *** (-4.350) -1.261 *** (2.410)
Ownership*MBR 0.061 (0.410) -0.223 (-0.410)
Ownership^2 10.121 (0.910) -0.921 ** (-2.200)
MBR^2 0.009 (1.410) 0.009 (0.150)
Dum01 1.100 * (1.810) -0.210 (-0.140)
Dum02 -1.011 * (-1.800) -0.187 (-0.950)
Dum03 -1.170 (-1.440) -0.514 (-0.880)
Dum04 -1.040 (-1.390) -0.185 (-0.470)
Dum05 -0.740 (-1.170) -0.114 (-0.140)
Dum06 -0.690 (-0.170) -0.212 (-0.140)
Dum07 -0.100 (-0.410) -0.151 (-0.850)
Const 7.140 * (1.910) 3.327 ** (2.120)
F Statistic 2.262 *** 3.755 ***
R-squared 0.041 0.074
Observations 923 42
(b)' United States (e)' Singapore
Endogenous Variable
ShortDebt -0.085 (-0.420) 1.622 (0.610)
Instruments Variables
ROA -0.127 *** (-3.220) 0.092 (0.590)
FirmSize -0.072 (-0.140) 0.921 (0.990)
MBR -0.355 (-0.410) -0.298 (-1.440)
Dum01 1.222 *** (4.110) -0.170 (-0.510)
Dum02 -0.415 (-0.840) -0.015 (-0.390)
Dum03 -0.384 (-0.760) -0.240 (-0.210)
Dum04 -0.377 (-0.840) -0.079 (-0.410)
Dum05 -0.314 (-0.580) -0.041 (-0.310)
Dum06 -0.225 (-0.410) 0.019 (0.200)
Dum07 -0.110 (-0.170) 0.088 (0.760)
Const 2.112 *** (3.420) 0.851 (1.310)
F Statistic 3.620 *** 2.260 ***
R-squared 0.032 0.024
Observations 923 42
OLS Pooling Model OLS Pooling Model
OLS Pooling Model OLS Pooling Model
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(B) REITs in major international markets
DER: Total Liability divided by Market Value of Capital, LongDebt: Long-term Debt divided by Total Liability,
ShortDebt: Short-term Debt divided by Total Liability, Concentration: Top Five Investment Asset Concentration
divided by Total Investment Assets, Tokyo23: Real Estate Assets Invested in Tokyo 23 wards divided by Total
Investment Assets, MetroArea: Real Estate Assets Invested in Tokyo excl. 23 wards plus neighboring
prefectures divided by Total Investment Assets, LocalCity: Real Estate Assets Invested in Local Cities other than
Tokyo23 and MetroArea divided by Total Investment Assets, Residence: Real Estate Assets Invested in Retail
Residence divided by Total Investment Assets, Office: Real Estate Assets Invested in Office Building divided by
Total Investment Assets, Hotel: Real Estate Assets Invested in Hotel divided by Total Investment Assets,
Commerce: Real Estate Assets Invested in Commercial Facilities divided by Total Investment Assets, Real Estate
Firms: Ownership ratio of a Top Real Estate Firm, Financial Institutions: Ownership ratio of a Top Financial
Institution, Foreigners: Ownership ratio of a Top Foreigner, ROA: Return on Total Assets, MBR: Total Liability
plus Market Value of Capital divided by Book Value of Total Assets, FirmSize: Natural Logarithm of Total
Assets.
(A) Liability Structure (B) Proxies of Asset Liquidation Value
(a) Concentration (b) Area (c) Use
DER LongDebt ShortDebt Concentration Tokyo23
MetroAre
a
LocalCity Residence
mean 1.089 0.575 0.239 0.474 0.523 0.064 0.215 0.316
s.d 1.477 0.246 0.192 0.233 0.282 0.140 0.239 0.474
max 13.608 0.992 0.955 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.976 1.000
min 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(C) Ownership Structure (D) Other Independent Variables
(c) Use
Office Hotel Commerce
Real Estate
Firms
Financial
Institutions
Foreigners ROA MBR FirmSize
mean 0.079 0.011 0.545 0.268 0.222 0.198 0.029 1.117 11.709
s.d 0.233 0.042 0.612 0.239 0.201 0.213 0.009 0.257 0.746
max 1.000 0.235 0.892 1.000 0.799 0.875 0.053 2.077 13.495
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.449 9.676
ShortDebt MBR ROA FirmSize Ownership
(a) Japan (N=41) mean 0.239 1.117 0.029 11.709 0.474
s.d. 0.192 0.257 0.009 0.746 0.223
max 0.955 2.077 0.053 13.495 1.000
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.676 0.000
(b) United States (N=149) mean 0.340 2.152 0.011 6.683 0.319
s.d. 0.298 11.603 0.690 2.005 0.254
max 0.981 293.541 5.159 10.961 1.000
min 0.000 0.000 -20.494 -5.065 0.000
(c) Canada (N=18) mean 0.085 1.122 0.000 6.143 0.443
s.d. 0.112 0.547 0.117 2.025 0.349
max 0.841 4.194 0.190 10.139 1.000
min 0.000 0.000 -1.416 -1.752 0.000
(d) Australia (N=34) mean 0.145 1.029 0.026 6.228 0.412
s.d. 0.312 0.386 0.144 2.091 0.315
max 0.968 4.901 0.359 10.928 1.000
min 0.000 0.028 -1.907 -0.227 0.000
(e) Singapore (N=16) mean 0.165 0.921 0.056 6.791 0.684
s.d. 0.218 0.429 0.114 1.320 0.273
max 0.971 4.358 0.848 9.510 0.988
min 0.000 0.217 -0.444 1.630 0.000
